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Harry C. Katz and David B. Lipsky
THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SYSTEM
IN THE UNITED STATES
The Legacy and the Lessons
“Allow me, Mr. Mayor, to interrupt you with a question,” 
said K. “Didyou not mention once before a Control Authority? 
From your description the whole economy is one that would rouse 
ones apprehensions if one could imagine the Control failing.”
“You re very strict,” said the Mayor, “but multiply your strict­
ness a thousand times and it would still be nothing compared with 
the strictness that the Authority imposes on itself. Only a total 
stranger would ask a question like yours. Is there a Control 
Authority? There are only Control Authorities. Frankly, it isn’t 
their function to hunt out errors in the vulgar sense, for errors 
don’t happen, and even when once in a while an error does hap­
pen, as in your case, who can say finally that it’s an error?”
“This is news indeed!” cried K.
— F r a n z  K a f k a , T h e  C a s t l e
- , r o m  Wo r l d  Wa r  II to t h e  1990s, t h e  c o l l e c t i v e
bargaining system in the United States evolved through two 
epochs. The first, which lasted from the end of war to the 
late 1970s, saw the construction and consolidation of what 
one of us (and his coauthors) has called “the New Deal sys­
tem of industrial relations” (Kochan et al., 1994). During the 
second era the New Deal industrial relations system came under se­
vere pressures and it began to be fundamentally transformed. The 
transformation is still occurring, and we cannot say if or when a new 
equilibrium will be established.
This essay examines and evaluates the evolution of collective bar­
gaining in the United States between 1945 and 1997. We have a central 
theme—an hypothesis—that guides our examination. We believe 
American collective bargaining has been very adept at resolving 
workplace problems—what might be termed “micro” problems such 
as individuals’ complaints (in unionized settings). On the other hand, 
collective bargaining in our society has never been adept at (or has 
been excluded from) dealing with “macro” problems. We have in mind 
two categories of macro problems. The first is “macro-organizational,” 
by which we mean the issues and concerns associated with the man-
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agement of the organization or enterprise. The second is “macroeco­
nomic,” and we have in mind especially the relationship between the 
industrial relations system and the macro economy.
At the micro level of American industrial relations, a highly effec­
tive system of “industrial jurisprudence” evolved over several decades, 
eventually covering almost all of the unionized segments of American 
industry in the 1940s and early 1950s (Chamberlain and Kuhn, 1965; 
Slichter, 1941; Lieserson, 1938). Especially after World War II, well- 
defined grievance procedures and voluntary grievance arbitration 
provisions were incorporated in the vast majority of collective bar­
gaining agreements. In addition, unions and employers negotiated de­
tailed provisions—what Dunlop termed “a web of rules” —controlling 
workplace decisions (Dunlop, 1958).1 Managers and supervisors still 
retained the right to make the key decisions, but increasingly their 
flexibility was constrained by contractual regulations and, ultimately, 
by arbitral authority.
At its best the American system of industrial jurisprudence not only 
guarantees fair and equitable treatment of employees, it contributes to 
the efficient and effective operation of the enterprise (Freeman and 
Medoff, 1984). But there was a dark side. As the system grew stronger 
after World War II, it grew more legalistic, more formal, more arcane. 
For many rank-and-file employees the system became nearly impene­
trable, impossible to understand, another bureaucratic mechanism de­
signed to frustrate, not serve them. The union hierarchy was often as 
bureaucratic and rigid as the corporate hierarchy. Collective bargain­
ing contracts, some as long as three hundred pages, were written for 
lawyers and by lawyers. For many ordinary employees, dealing with 
union and management officials was often akin to dealing with the 
Department of Motor Vehicles or the Internal Revenue Service. At its 
worst, the industrial relations system was a Kafkaesque nightmare, an 
unending series of control authorities that never admitted error.
All the while the system of industrial jurisprudence was being elab­
orated, refined, and perfected, critical macro problems went unat­
tended. The American economy lurched from recession to prosperity 
to recession, and American manufacturers, battered by foreign com­
petitors, retrenched and retreated. The financial declines suffered by 
heavily unionized industries had dire consequences for unions and 
their members, but by and large unions were prevented from being in­
volved (or chose not to be) in management’s efforts to prevent cata­
strophe. Collective bargaining guaranteed workers fair treatment on 
the job—up until the day the plant closed. Grievance and arbitration 
cases were often hotly contested—even after the firm declared bank­
ruptcy. Unions received a flow of dues through contractual union se­
curity clauses while union representation across the economy 
declined seemingly inexorably. It looked as though the parties were 
often arguing over how to arrange the deck chairs on the Titanic.
This essay is organized in the following fashion. In the next section 
we reach back to 1945 and the birth of the postwar system of industrial 
relations. That year, in the very same month the ILR School was 
founded, President Truman convened a National Labor-Management 
Conference in Washington. We examine the debates at that conference 
because they provide a prism through which we can view the shaping 
of the postwar system. We then consider the evolution of the New Deal 
collective bargaining system with special attention to three key features 
of the American collective bargaining system: the right to strike, the 
grievance arbitration procedure, and decentralized bargaining struc­
tures. We examine each of these features to better understand the 
strengths and weaknesses of American collective bargaining.
Then we focus specifically on the contemporary period—the 1980s 
and 1990s—and briefly review the transformation of the New Deal 
system. The system began to crack because of the stress of the chang­
ing economic and political environment—and in particular because 
of growing international competition, economic stagnation, corporate 
restructuring, and deregulation. In our examination of recent changes 
we return to a focus on the three key features of the traditional system
we examined earlier and illustrate how each of these features was 
modified in the face of the restructuring occurring at the workplace.
We then examine the American industrial relations system’s special 
talent for addressing micro issues and the limited attention paid to 
macro concerns. In this section we also review some of the lessons for 
public policy that follow from our assessments of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the American system of collective bargaining.
The Past Is Prologue
The thirty-six delegates gathered in 1945 at the three-week National 
Labor-Management Conference in Washington included the highest- 
ranking business executives and labor leaders in the nation.2 It was a 
propitious moment for such a conference—and for the founding of a 
new school devoted to industrial relations. World War II had ended 
in August and wartime controls on labor relations were about to be 
lifted. Many feared that conversion to a peacetime economy would 
bring about the resumption of the Great Depression, and there was a 
widespread expectation that the strife and tumult that had character­
ized American labor relations before World War II would resume in 
full force. The shape of the postwar industrial relations system could 
be only dimly perceived.
It was in this atmosphere that President Truman asked Secretary of 
Labor Lewis B. Schwellenbach and Secretary of Commerce Henry A. 
Wallace to mount a conference that would, he hoped, set the ground 
rules for labor and management in the postwar era. In his opening ad­
dress, on November 6,1945, the president said, “Our country is wor­
ried about our industrial relations. It has a right to be.” He implored 
the labor and management leaders at the conference to work out ma­
chinery that would serve to resolve collective bargaining disputes 
peacefully. He linked the peaceful settlement of labor disputes to the 
nation’s prospects for postwar prosperity. In his view, labor-manage­
ment cooperation was a necessary condition for economic expansion 
(President’s National Labor-Management Conference, 1946, General 
Committee: 5-9).
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Many commentators have considered President Truman’s confer­
ence an important stepping-stone in the development of the postwar 
system of industrial relations. The conferees, however, managed to 
reach agreement on only two issues: they supported the use of “concil­
iation” (or mediation), rather than compulsory arbitration or fact­
finding, to resolve new contract disputes, and they strongly endorsed 
voluntary arbitration to resolve grievance disputes. The conferees’ 
consensus on these points is considered to have had a significant 
influence on the spread of grievance arbitration provisions in collec­
tive bargaining contracts in the next decade (Slichter et al., i960: 
746-47; Taft, 1964: 565-66).
From our perspective, the president’s conference was remarkable in 
at least three additional respects. First, now we may well question the 
premise that thirty-six labor, management, and public officials 
could—if they reached agreement—decide the direction of the post­
war industrial relations system. At the time, opposition to the confer­
ence came primarily from independent and left-wing unions, which 
were excluded from the conference.3 Truman’s notion that an elite tri­
partite group could “furnish a broad and permanent foundation for 
industrial peace and progress” apparently was widely shared by the 
press and the general public (President’s National Labor-Management 
Conference, 1946, General Committee: 5).
This example of “limited corporatism” (the phrase is Heckscher’s, 
1988: 50) has had many counterparts, including the effort by the Clinton 
administration, through the “Dunlop Commission” (the Commission 
on the Future of Worker-Management Relations), to deal with labor law 
reform (U.S. Department of Labor, 1994). The Truman conference, the 
Dunlop Commission, and other related efforts illustrate the potential 
and the pitfalls of the corporatist approach to policymaking.
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The second remarkable feature of the Truman conference is 
illustrated by the following passage from a speech delivered during the 
proceedings by one of the key participants: “Labor unions are woven 
into our economic pattern of American life, and collective bargaining is 
a part of the democratic process. The nation and management must 
recognize this fact. I say recognize this fact not only with our lips but 
with our hearts” (Presidents National Labor-Management Conference, 
1946, General Committee: 52). Was this declaration offered by CIO 
President Phil Murray or Mineworker President John L. Lewis? No. It 
was contained in the heartfelt remarks of Eric Johnston, president of 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. It is hard to imagine any recent presi­
dent of the Chamber offering a similar endorsement of unions and col­
lective bargaining!
It may be difficult today to remember that management fealty to col­
lective bargaining was routinely expressed by business executives (es­
pecially those heading large corporations) until the 1970s. Such 
expressions were thought to be emblematic of “the end of ideology” 
(Bell, i960; see also Lipsky and Donn, 1987:328-29).
Third, despite Eric Johnstons exhortation, the conferees failed to 
reach agreement on any of the critical issues they examined other 
than grievance arbitration and conciliation, although they did also 
pass a resolution calling for equal opportunity in respect to race, sex, 
religion, age, and national origin in determining “who are employed 
and who are admitted to labor union membership” (Presidents 
National Labor-Management Conference, 1946, Executive Committee: 
50). Secretary Wallace urged the conference to deal with larger macro- 
economic issues, such as the relationship between wage bargains and 
national income. Murray pushed consideration of a national wage 
standard. But AFL President William Green, as well as the business 
leaders, did not support either Murray’s or Wallace’s position. The 
deadlock that developed on most issues frustrated many participants. 
The bright promise of the conference had not been fulfilled.
The New Deal System of Collective Bargaining
Looking back, we can see the embryo of the postwar collective bar­
gaining system forming in the deliberations at President Truman’s 
conference. Both labor and management, at the end of World War II, 
were anxious to rationalize and bring order to a chaotic workplace. 
Both sides were willing to develop processes and procedures that 
would serve to regulate employment relationships. At many work sites 
a broad, if fragile, consensus developed that would last for more than 
a quarter of a century. Managers would recognize the legitimacy of 
unions and collective bargaining but only if unions restricted their 
concerns to well-defined workplace issues.
The Right to Strike and Voluntary Mediation
Perhaps the most important right that unions used to establish or re­
tain their status as an independent representative of the workforce in 
the New Deal system was the right to strike. At first glance the right to 
strike might seem like an outmoded and costly privilege unsuited to a 
world where cooperation between labor and management is needed 
to foster competitiveness. Strikes also may appear to be unfair because 
the threat of the strike, or the strike itself, thereby becomes the key de­
terminant of labor and management’s bargaining power. Is the system 
fair when some unions (and workers) have relatively poor employ­
ment conditions as a result of their limited strike leverage while other 
unions (and workers) gain substantial improvements in employment 
terms because they are able to wage effective strikes?
While the determination of employment terms and conditions 
through strike leverage may appear unfair in a “limited” sense, in a 
broader view we find the right to strike to be an essential feature of our 
industrial relations system. The use of strike leverage is fair because it 
gives the parties the ability to determine employment terms and condi­
tions through their own actions. With the right to strike, an outside and 
potentially arbitrary force cannot determine bargaining outcomes. 
Furthermore, because both parties are forced to face the potentially high 
costs of a strike, both must therefore confront one another and work
through their disagreements. As a result, the solutions that derive from 
the threat of a strike or its occurrence are more responsive to the needs 
and wants of the parties than settlement terms dictated by a third party
The strike is perhaps even more important as a mechanism that 
provides more balance to the distribution of power between labor and 
management as compared to a world where labor is denied this right. 
Without this right, management has an inevitable undue advantage.
The strike is also useful because it serves as a pressure valve draw­
ing the attention of both sides, and gives each side the opportunity to 
vent its feelings regularly and quickly. Societies essentially have a 
choice between the occasional disturbances associated with strikes or 
suffering the pent-up frustrations and periodic crises that occur in 
systems that restrict labors right to strike, a situation epitomized by 
the instability and social conflict that have periodically exploded in 
South Korea.
An important feature of our industrial relations system that has 
reduced the frequency and length of strikes is the mediation services 
that are available to labor and management through federal and state 
agencies. The professional and voluntary nature of these services has 
worked well. Also, the emergency dispute resolution procedures pro­
vided through the Taft-Hartley amendments have served to con­
strain conflict in the few cases where they have been initiated 
(Cullen, 1968). Developing countries, in particular, searching for 
ways to provide greater stability and regularity in industrial rela­
tions, would be well advised to imitate the American mediation and 
emergency dispute procedures (Katz et al., 1993).
In the New Deal system management insisted on its “right to man­
age” —on controlling strategic decisions on products, prices, invest­
ments, and other matters “at the core of entrepreneurial authority.” 
(The term is drawn from the Supreme Court decision in First 
National Maintenance.) Management also insisted on its right to man­
age the workforce. Especially in manufacturing industries, employers 
negotiated provisions in collective bargaining agreements that re­
served for management the right to hire, fire, discipline, and otherwise 
control decisions affecting their employees subject to provisions in
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their collective bargaining agreement (Chamberlain and Kuhn, 1963: 
100-114). As the postwar system developed, unions increasingly ceded 
to management control over the substance of workplace decisions, but 
insisted that management adhere to certain standards and procedures 
in making such decisions.
The Grievance Arbitration Procedure
The postwar growth of grievance arbitration—spurred in part by 
Trumans conference—is clearly a significant factor that served to re­
duce industrial conflict. The grievance procedure with binding third- 
party arbitration as the final step in the dispute resolution 
mechanism has long been heralded as the most innovative feature of 
American collective bargaining (Kuhn, 1961). There is much 
justification for this high praise.
A grievance arbitration provision in a collective bargaining con­
tract is almost always paired with a “no-strike, no-lockout” provision. 
As a consequence, the use of grievance procedures and arbitration has 
dramatically reduced (although not totally eliminated) the occurrence 
of work stoppages during the term of a contract. The grievance proce­
dure, particularly the final recourse to arbitration, also provides an 
equally important check on unwarranted actions by managements 
that seek to alter employment terms during the term of the agree­
ment. These procedures thereby limit autocratic actions by either 
management or labor and create orderly procedures that resolve dis­
putes arising during the term of a labor agreement. In that way, the 
procedures provide an important balancing of power during the life 
of a labor agreement and complement the power-balancing role 
served by the right to strike during contract negotiations. The griev­
ance arbitration procedure also promotes procedural fairness. As 
noted by others, the grievance hearing gives both sides a chance to 
“present their cases” in an open and judicial manner.
The grievance system contributed to the reduction in industrial 
conflict (particularly those strikes of long duration and those
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involving violence) that occurred as the New Deal system matured 
(Ross and Hartman, i960). It is perhaps an irony that the decline of 
industrial conflict in the United States corresponded with the rise of 
conflict and confrontation throughout the rest of our society.
Unions, of course, did aggressively pursue wage increases through­
out the postwar period until the dawn of the concession era in 1979. 
Increasingly unions expanded the scope of their influence to include 
other economic supplements, such as pension and health care plans. At 
the apex of their power, American unions succeeded in winning wages 
that were as much as 30 percent greater than wages earned by compa­
rable non-union workers (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). A key attribute 
of the postwar wage-setting system was its decentralized structure.
Decentralized Collective Bargaining and Wage Setting
In the United States, although there is a wide variety of bargaining 
structures, most collective bargaining occurs at either the company or 
plant level. Even though a few industries, such as bituminous coal, in­
tercity trucking, and basic steel, traditionally bargained on a multi­
company basis, compared to the bargaining structures in other 
countries collective bargaining in the United States was and remains 
relatively decentralized (Katz, 1993).
Decentralized collective bargaining spurred innovation. Since 
bargaining was occurring at numerous and varied levels, labor and 
management had the opportunity to experiment with a variety of com­
pensation techniques and methods. The consequence was the creation 
in the unionized sector of many compensation innovations that later 
spread to the non-union sector. In the early post-World War II years, 
for example, company-paid life insurance, health benefits, and cost-of- 
living escalators were first introduced into major collective bargaining 
agreements and then spread throughout the economy. The union sector 
later introduced supplemental unemployment benefits, “thirty-and- 
out” pensions, and a host of other compensation innovations.
A key feature of post-World War II collective bargaining that resulted 
from decentralization was the separation of wagesetting from the deter­
mination of work rules and work practices. It has been commonplace in 
the contracts covering industrial (and many other) workers to have 
wages and fringe benefits set at the company or multi-plant level, while 
work rules (particularly the specific form and content of the job 
classification structure) have been set at the local (often plant) level. 
Again, there were good reasons for this practice. Setting wages at a more 
centralized level allowed the union to enjoy standardized labor costs and 
avoid the sort of whipsawing that might have followed from more local­
ized wage determination. Determining compensation at the company 
level also benefited companies by simplifying the administration of com­
plex fringe benefit programs. Work rules were left to be set at more local 
levels because it was at these local levels that the needs of particular 
plants or workers could be addressed in a more flexible manner.
Transformation Redux
While the traditional collective bargaining system performed reason­
ably well during its heyday, it came under severe pressures by the late 
1970s. The American system of industrial relations had been moving 
through a period of transformation for nearly fifteen years, but—as in 
1945—no one can be certain what shape the fully transformed system 
will take. Partisans from several camps are struggling to control the 
destiny of the system, and no one knows which camp will win out. Will 
we have a system of high-performance work organizations, featuring 
self-managed teams and union participation in enterprise decision 
making? Or will we have a union-free system operated by human re­
source managers, lawyers, and consultants, possibly constrained only 
by government regulations? Will we witness a resurgence of pragmatic, 
job-control unionism and the return of traditional labor relations? Or 
will we see highly developed forms of union and employee participa­
tion spread throughout industry?
Our crystal ball is not any clearer than anyone elses. We can, how­
ever, summarize some of the significant changes that have occurred in
the postwar, New Deal system of collective bargaining. (More com­
prehensive accounts are contained in Kochan et al., 1994; Heckscher, 
1988; Bluestone and Bluestone, 1992.)
The Decline of the Union Movement
In 1945 President Truman had to reckon with the political power of 
the unions represented by Bill Green, Phil Murray, and John L. Lewis. 
In 1965 President Johnson had to reckon with George Meany, Walter 
Reuther, and Jimmy Hoffa. In 1985 President Reagan largely ignored 
the labor leaders then in office. Over the course of the postwar period, 
the arc of union influence declined toward insignificance.
The decline of union influence corresponded to, and may have 
been caused by, the erosion of union membership. Union member­
ship as a proportion of the labor force has been declining since 1953, 
from 26 percent to 11 percent in 1996 (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; 
Kochan et al., 1994). Particularly sharp declines in union strength 
began in the late 1970s.
Concession bargaining in the 1980s was an obvious manifestation 
of the decline of union influence. Concession agreements were the 
prism through which economic, political, social, and technological 
forces worked their will on the parties. Throughout the postwar pe­
riod American unions, following Samuel Gompers’s dictum, had 
sought “more” ; now they had to settle for less. At many work sites 
unions agreed to wage freezes and cutbacks; they gave up deferred 
wage provisions and cost-of-living clauses. They agreed to help con­
trol spiraling health care costs by accepting co-pay arrangements and 
large deductibles in their health insurance policies. They agreed to 
convert from defined-benefit to defined-contribution pension plans; 
in some cases they accepted employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) 
and profit-sharing schemes in lieu of standard pension plans. In sum, 
the wage premium (and, more broadly, the compensation premium) 
that organized workers enjoyed through most of the postwar era de­
clined during the 1980s. As a consequence, unorganized workers had 
less incentive to form or join unions.
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The Legitimization of Management Opposition
Management opposition to unions gained a new legitimacy in the 1980s. 
One would have to search hard to find a contemporary CEO who shares 
Eric Johnstons sentiments. The key event that brought management op­
position out of corporate executive offices was President Reagan’s firing 
of twelve thousand air traffic controllers in August 1981. The air traffic, 
controllers were engaged in an illegal strike, and the president acted 
with the full authority of federal law. Nevertheless, the president, in ef­
fect, put his stamp of approval on union busting. Many employers 
needed little coaxing to follow the president’s example. As Bluestone and 
Bluestone note, “ They rolled up their sleeves, took a deep breath, and 
proceeded to imitate a management style pioneered by the Prussian 
military” (Bluestone and Bluestone, 1992: 8).
Frank Lorenzo, the CEO of Eastern Airlines, Fred Curry, head of the 
Greyhound bus line, and a handful of other employers hired strike­
breakers and used a variety of other tactics designed to break their 
unions. Ironically, their get-tough tactics often proved ineffective and 
self-defeating—Eastern and Greyhound were driven into bankruptcy 
(Bluestone and Bluestone, 1992: 8-9). Even if Lorenzo, Curry, and other 
union-busters represent the fringe of American management, there 
were many employers in the mainstream who embraced union-free and 
union-avoidance strategies. Some scholars maintain that management 
opposition was the principal cause of the decline of unionism in the 
United States (Lawler, 1990; Freeman and Medoff, 1984).
Shifting the Burden of Risk and Uncertainty
At the apex of their power, American unions succeeded in winning 
from employers numerous contractual provisions that served to pro­
tect their members from the risks and uncertainties of the market­
place. Product markets are (perhaps now more than ever) extremely 
volatile, heavily subject to cyclical and structural changes. Sales, rev­
enues, and profits rise and fall; prosperity is followed by recession, 
and fortunes wax and wane. There is risk and uncertainty in the labor 
market also. Companies shut down or relocate; jobs come and go.
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Workers continue to suffer accidents, illnesses, and other disruptions 
in their lives while the social safety net is eroding. Both employers and 
employees are subject to hazards and perils, and it is worth consider­
ing who bears the costs of these risks and uncertainties.
Through most of the post-World War II period, the costs associ­
ated with risk and uncertainty were shifted from employees to em­
ployers. For example, in the precedent-setting UAW-GM contract of 
1948 Walter Reuther succeeded in getting an “annual improvement 
factor” and a cost-of-living provision included in the autoworkers’ 
contract (Katz, 1985). The principle that workers’ wages should rise 
with productivity and be protected from inflation was established. 
Reuther’s breakthrough was copied by unions and employers in most 
of the core industries. Employers thus assumed more of the costs as­
sociated with the uncertainties of inflation.
Similarly, industrial unions (but not craft unions) negotiated 
defined-benefit pension plans in the late 1940s and 1950s: in principle, 
if not always in fact, employers were obligated to set aside whatever 
sums of money were actuarially required to pay the pension benefits 
they had promised their employees. Conceptually, defined-benefit 
pension plans require specific employer contributions regardless of 
the market conditions faced by the employer. These contributions 
protect retirees and employees participating in the plans and shift the 
risks to employers.
Unions also negotiated various job guarantees (fixed work crews and 
no-layoff provisions) and income protection schemes (supplemental 
unemployment benefits and severance pay provisions). All of these 
contract provisions protected employees from the vagaries of competi­
tion and the marketplace, and shifted the attendant risks to employers.
But this picture changed dramatically in the 1980s. During the con­
cession era, many unions gave up the income and job protections they 
had previously won. Employees were increasingly called upon to share 
the cost associated with market volatility and individual hazards. Con­
tingent pay—pay based on the worker’s or the firm’s performance—be­
came commonplace. Profit-sharing, gain-sharing, and skill-based pay 
plans spread through industry. Increasingly the fortunes of employees 
were linked to, not dissociated from, the fortunes of employers.
A Diversity of Participation
If American unions have been in serious retreat in recent years, they 
have also had a few victories to celebrate. Unions in the public sector 
have generally fared better than unions in the private sector. About 40 
percent of all government employees are organized for collective bar­
gaining purposes. The proportion is close to 75 percent for public 
school teachers (Burton and Thomason, 1988). In some political juris­
dictions, budget cutbacks have put public sector unions on the defen­
sive, forcing concession agreements similar to those in the private 
sector. But in most state and local governments, unions have become 
more firmly entrenched over the course of the last two decades.
In the private sector, there are some well-known cases of exemplary 
union-management relationships: UNITE/Xerox, Chemical 
Workers/Shell-Sarnia, American Flint and Glassworkers/Corning, and 
UNITE/Levi Strauss. Particularly noteworthy is the UAW’s relation­
ship with Saturn, which many commentators maintain is the leading 
example of a high-performance work system in which the union and 
the employer are full-fledged “partners” in the management of the en­
terprise (Kochan et al., 1994; Bluestone and Bluestone, 1992).
Although the breakup of the Bell system in the 1980s resulted in 
some rocky labor relations in the telecommunications industry, by the 
1990s AT&T and its unions (the Communications Workers, the IBEW, 
and independent unions) had not only overcome their difficulties, 
they had negotiated some particularly innovative agreements on 
health care, work and family issues, employee involvement, business 
unit-based bargaining, and employee training. Labor relations in a 
number of the baby Bells also improved significantly.
Some unions, bucking the trend, experienced significant growth in 
the 1980s and 1990s. The Service Employees International Union, 
which organizes in the health care and public sectors, as well as the 
service sector, grew substantially. The United Food and Commercial
Workers, which focuses its effort in retail and wholesale trade, also 
saw its membership rolls expand.
Even where industries were contracting and union membership 
declining, unions often found employers willing to expand union par­
ticipation in decision making. In 1993, for example, the Steelworkers 
negotiated a series of agreements with the basic steel companies that 
provided for union and worker representation on a host of company- 
and plant-level committees concerned with business issues. The UAW, 
in addition to its pioneering agreement at Saturn, negotiated other 
agreements with the major auto producers that contained innovative 
employee participation provisions (Katz and MacDuffie, 1994).
Indeed, employee participation, involvement, and empowerment 
schemes have become the labor relations totems of the current era. 
Everywhere, in both union and non-union companies, management 
pays obeisance to such schemes. Managers’ commitment to participa­
tion in the 1990s matches their commitment to collective bargaining 
in the 1940s. It may be equally heartfelt, but in some places it may also 
be equally shallow.
For their part, unions retain a degree of skepticism about manage­
ment’s newfound commitment to employee empowerment. Many 
union leaders fear that management’s encouragement of employee 
participation is merely a ruse to weaken unions or keep them out of 
the enterprise completely (Heckscher, 1988:116-17). On the other 
hand, most union leaders also see the potential gain in participatory 
arrangements and know from experience that while some managers 
are genuinely committed, some are not (Katz, 1988).
Almost everyone nowadays is in favor of enhanced employee partic­
ipation. Liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans alike sing its 
praises. Charles Heckscher points out that a poll conducted by the 
Opinion Research Corporation found that 86 percent of business exec­
utives and 76 percent of union leaders strongly favored cooperative 
labor relations (Heckscher, 1988: 270). If Democrats, Republicans, labor 
leaders, and business executives all favor cooperation and oppose ad- 
versarialism, is it likely that all have the same concept in mind? Have we 
been witnessing the reality of cooperation, or merely the rhetoric?
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We believe that the contemporary infatuation with participation 
and cooperation is expressed in concrete terms in only a small pro­
portion of labor-management relationships. Scratch the surface and 
one is likely to find that management control and labor-management 
adversarialism are very much alive and well.
Adjustments in the System
Yet, as the transformation described above developed, the three fea­
tures of the traditional American collective bargaining system de­
scribed earlier did adjust. We now focus on those adjustments.
The Withering Away of the Right to Strike
If the United States has not quite entered an era of genuine labor- 
management cooperation, it has nevertheless experienced a dramatic 
long-term decline in the overt forms of industrial conflict (the princi­
pal form being the strike). Ross and Hartman in i960 predicted the 
“withering away of the strike,” and their prediction now appears a 
valid one. In 1946 there were nearly five thousand strikes in the United 
States and more than 1 percent of total working time was lost to work 
stoppages. Nowadays strike activity is less than one-tenth of those lev­
els. Scholars have enumerated a long list of reasons for the decline of 
industrial conflict. A major reason is the decline of the labor move­
ment: weakened unions simply cannot risk a strike against strong em­
ployers. It should be noted that union weakness was not the reason 
Ross and Hartman expected strike rates to decline. On the contrary, 
they expected a decline in conflict to follow from the expansion and 
maturation of collective bargaining.
Some have claimed that the right to strike is now a meaningless 
privilege in the United States in the face of the ready access manage­
ment has to permanent striker replacements and management’s abil­
ity to shift production to other sites or to use technology to substitute 
for striking workers. Although economic pressures, such as intensified 
international and non-union competition, have clearly reduced labor’s
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bargaining leverage in recent years, we believe it is a gross exaggera­
tion to claim that the strike is now a meaningless threat. Nor is the 
role of the strike eliminated because of the restructuring occurring in 
work organization and the emergence of greater worker and union 
participation in decision making.
In our view, strikes and the threat of a strike continue to provide 
labor with bargaining leverage, even at sites where new industrial rela- 
. tions have blossomed, and will continue to do so because new work 
systems do not and cannot eliminate all the conflicts of interests that 
divide labor and management. Nevertheless, the frequency of strikes 
declined sharply for a number of reasons. After Reagan fired the air 
traffic controllers, an increasing number of employers were embold­
ened to exercise their legal right to replace striking employees. The 
labor movement then began an effort to obtain legislation that would 
prevent employers from permanently replacing striking employees, 
but its efforts were unsuccessful.
Some scholars have noted the growing “technological obsolescence” 
of the strike. The term was coined by James L. Stern in 1964. In indus­
tries like telecommunications, utilities, chemicals, and oil refining the 
introduction of automation and sophisticated technologies allowed 
employers to operate for long periods without bargaining-unit em­
ployees. It was not necessary in these industries for employers to re­
place strikers; they could operate quite adequately by using their own 
supervisory personnel and non-union workers (Hutchens et al., 1989).
The declining effectiveness of the strike can also be attributed to 
the growth of conglomerates and multinational corporations, which 
are in a better position to subsidize struck facilities than smaller do­
mestic companies. International competition, more generally, consti­
tutes a serious constraint on a union’s propensity to strike; unions 
fully realize that a strike against a domestic company that competes 
with foreign producers may imperil both the company’s and the 
union’s very existence.
There are still other reasons for the decline of the strike. Since re­
cession and high levels of unemployment deter unions from striking,
the protracted recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s surely 
served to reduce strike activity. The law, through its restrictions on 
secondary boycotts, jurisdictional disputes, organizing strikes, and 
other forms of concerted activity, is another explanatory factor.
The Limitations of the Grievance Arbitration Procedure
While the grievance procedure is a valuable mechanism for the resolu­
tion of specific problems that arise during the life of agreements, it has 
severe limitations as a mechanism to address the wider issues that now 
confront labor and management. Again, the problems are most appar­
ent in the face of the recent escalation in efforts to reorganize work and 
restructure labor-management relations along more participatory lines.
Two interrelated problems limit the effectiveness of the grievance 
procedure in addressing the extensive reorganizations under way. One 
problem arises from the narrow focus of the grievance procedure on 
specific workplace problems. The grievance procedure is adept at ad­
dressing issues such as whether an individual has been treated fairly 
with regard to a performance evaluation, a disciplinary action, or 
bumping rights. Yet, the key problems confronting labor and manage­
ment these days concern wider organizational matters such as the na­
ture of work organization, training methods, revisions of pay systems 
(often involving the introduction of more contingent pay), the ex­
change of information concerning business plans and investments, 
and the comparative economic and industrial relations performance 
of work sites and work groups. Disputes commonly arise over deci­
sions concerning the design and implementation of new work prac­
tices. These disputes generally cut across and combine problems that 
involve a number of work practices and many workers and, often, a 
number of different sites across a labor agreement’s jurisdiction. The 
grievance procedure is not designed to resolve problems where trade­
offs must be made across issues or modifications made in a number of 
work practices.
Secondly, when the grievance procedure has been employed to set­
tle disputes concerning these wider issues, it is often cumbersome 
and inadequate. Part of the difficulty that the grievance procedure
has in dealing with work reorganization problems follows from the 
status quo orientation of grievance arbitrators. As the research litera­
ture shows, arbitrators tend to adhere to judicial-like due process and 
to make decisions that follow well-established standards and norms 
(Bazerman, 1985). But arbitrators are not a good source for new ideas 
and new practices. Arbitrators are neither ill-meaning nor poorly 
trained. Rather, the identification of appropriate new practices in the 
work reorganization domain typically requires the sort of trial and 
error and experienced-based knowledge that arbitrators or other 
outsiders do not possess.
As a consequence of the difficulties the grievance procedure has en­
countered with problems that cut across issues, labor and management 
in recent years have created more informal discussion processes and 
modes. As a result, the grievance procedure is increasingly becoming 
less central and less helpful to shop floor dispute resolution. Instead, 
labor and management are turning to forums, field tests, and other 
mechanisms that provide more effective resolution of problems.4
If the problem were only that the grievance procedure is ill suited 
to solve the sorts of issues that are at the center of shop floor indus­
trial relations these days, then we might merely lament the procedure s 
loss of relevance. Unfortunately, there is something more troubling 
that has resulted from the legacy of grievance arbitration: the griev­
ance procedure itself must bear some of the blame for the slow re­
sponse by labor and management to workplace problems. The 
grievance procedure to some extent contains a narcotic element that 
discourages the development of expertise within the workforce and 
plant-level management.
In the well-functioning grievance system a few external experts— 
third-party arbitrators—settle shop floor problems by relying on their 
understanding of workplace problems and fair solutions that they de­
velop through many diverse experiences. Previous analysts of the 
grievance system have heralded the virtues of this cadre of broadly 
knowledgeable arbitrators (Chamberlain and Kuhn, 1965). The prob­
lem labor and management have with this system is that the logic of 
the new systems of work organization requires workers and managers
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on the shop floor to become the experts in resolving shop floor prob­
lems. Yet, the long-standing existence and previous success of the 
grievance system lead workers and managers to avoid developing 
such expertise on the grounds that they can always rely on the arbitra­
tors to settle disputes. Management has long denied workers partici­
pation in workplace decisions so as to protect managerial control and 
prerogatives. Unfortunately, the grievance procedure serves to rein­
force this strict hierarchy.
Where the parties continue to have ultimate recourse to arbitrators to 
solve shop floor problems, the legacy of written grievances and formal 
hearings lives on. A telling example of the harmful efforts of this legacy 
is provided in the administration of the GM-UAW Jobs Bank program 
at an auto plant in Rochester, New York.5 The Jobs Bank was initiated in 
the 1980s with the goal of developing more “internal flexibility” in the al­
location of labor in General Motors plants. The program promoted flex­
ibility through the redeployment of otherwise laid-off workers as 
substitutes for workers on the line who then had the opportunity to at­
tend training programs. In addition, the plan also was to use the Jobs 
Bank as a conduit to reassign laid-off workers into “nonconventional” 
job assignments and thereby, in effect, avoid the rigidities that derived 
from the job classification structure found in GM-UAW local contracts.
Once the Jobs Bank program began to operate at the Rochester 
Products plant, however, both labor and management quickly began to 
write and then argue about detailed rules regarding such matters as the 
role of seniority in Jobs Bank assignments. A few months into the pro­
gram a long manual of rules had been negotiated specifying elaborate 
procedures regarding the administration of the Jobs Bank at this plant. 
When the labor and management officials who were administering the 
program were asked why they were creating such elaborate rules, they 
pointed to the experience they had acquired in such rule-making 
through the grievance procedure and suggested that they were doing 
just what they and others in their respective organizations thought was 
appropriate to settle shop floor problems. It is ironic that in a program
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designed to create more internal flexibility, the parties were constrained 
by the model of and their experience with the grievance system.
In addition to a cadre of well-trained arbitrators, what is needed 
now are more workers, local union officers, supervisors, and man­
agers who have an understanding of the dynamics, pressures, and al­
ternative work practices within and across industries. Adjustments are 
occurring. In response to this need for internally generated shop floor 
experts, there has been a subtle shift under way in labor education to­
ward the very sort of industry education that we believe is missing in 
the grievance and arbitration procedures. For example, at Cornell 
University’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations, the Division of 
Extension and Public Service has shifted over the past ten years away 
from traditional grievance and shop steward training in the direction 
of programs that teach new modes of labor-management bargaining 
(often called win-win bargaining) and provide background informa­
tion that helps unionists and managers to develop expertise on work 
reorganization and participatory roles. This shift in labor education is 
consistent with the idea that workers need knowledge developed 
through practical experience in order to provide effective use of the 
“voice” opportunities that collective bargaining provides.
While we worry about the unfavorable spillover effects that the griev­
ance arbitration procedure may have on the ability of labor and man­
agement to innovate in work reorganization, we certainly do not believe 
that the grievance procedure is without value. It can continue to play a 
useful role in settling some shop floor problems, particularly those deal­
ing with individual complaints regarding discipline. What might be the 
best solution would be the creation of informal and integrative prob­
lem-solving procedures that deal with work reorganization alongside a 
grievance procedure used to settle individual-based complaints.
Bargaining Structures Become Even More Decentralized
An important virtue of the American collective bargaining approach 
lies in the fact that labor and management have the authority to deter­
mine their own bargaining structure and have used that discretion to
fashion structures that fit their needs. The historical avoidance of 
multicompany or sectoral bargaining has proved to be particularly 
valuable in the face of recent pressures for substantial interindustry 
and intercompany wage variation as a result of heightened and vary­
ing competitive pressures.
Labor and management have responded to these economic pres­
sures in recent years by decentralizing collective bargaining and wage 
setting even further, often to the plant level (Katz, 1993). In the process, 
many of the few multicompany bargaining structures have either dis­
appeared as in basic steel or eroded as in trucking and coal. The de­
centralized form of collective bargaining in the United States has 
allowed the parties to respond to environmental pressures without the 
sort of wider structural and legal changes required to allow decentral­
ization in other countries like Australia. We attribute some of the revi­
talization that has occurred in American unionized settings 
(particularly in a number of manufacturing firms) from the mid-1980s 
on, to the flexibility found in our decentralized bargaining structures.
While decentralization may have spurred experimentation and flex­
ibility, at the same time it deters the diffusion of innovative ideas. In 
earlier periods, the slow spread of new compensation ideas that origi­
nated in innovative unionized firms could be tolerated, but the height­
ened intensity of international competition means that natural 
time-consuming diffusion is now a drawback. Thus, although at some 
sites labor and management have found ways in recent years to link 
employee compensation more directly to employee skills through pay- 
for-knowledge, or to company or plant performance through gain- 
sharing programs, there are many more firms and unions that have 
been slow to learn of these innovative techniques. Recent data reveal a 
haphazard and often piecemeal adoption of teamwork and participa­
tory industrial relations (Osterman, 1994; Eaton and Voos, 1992).
This problem of slow diffusion of innovation provides the rationale 
for government to become involved in educating and encouraging in­
novative practice. Although market pressures also provide incentives 
for learning, these incentives appear to be weak and indirect. At the 
same time that government action is needed to spread good ideas, it is
important to remember that innovative practices most often originate 
in the parties’ practical experimentation and give-and-take.
Other problems emerged as a consequence of the separation of 
compensation from work-practice determination found in traditional 
collective bargaining negotiations. Although this separation may have 
made sense in earlier periods, it makes much less sense now. Again, re­
cent competitive pressures and changes in the organization of work 
are compelling. In the current environment labor and management 
are struggling to introduce team systems of work and spread partici­
patory industrial relations. This reorganization of work and industrial 
relations is often driven by the need to shift problem solving down to 
the shop floor and work group level, and effectively utilize new tech­
nologies that require quick responsiveness and direct worker input 
into the resolution of quality and production problems. Yet, the sepa­
ration of compensation and work-practice determination at different 
bargaining levels makes it difficult to alter work organization radically. 
Team systems of work, for example, often function best where they are 
accompanied by “contingent” compensation systems that link em­
ployee pay to either employee skills or economic performance. The 
introduction of new work methods thus requires trade-offs across pay 
and work practices, trade-offs that are difficult to arrange where these 
issues are negotiated at different bargaining levels.
The Need to Address and Coordinate 
Macro and Micro Issues
How has the American industrial relations system performed overall 
and how can that performance be improved? Our evaluation and rec­
ommendations are guided by the fact that effective industrial relations 
requires mechanisms that address both macro- and microeconomic 
issues. With regard to macroeconomic issues, we have in mind broad 
pay and employment trends in the economy and sectoral economic 
dislocations and adjustments. Microeconomic issues concern shop 
floor-level performance, problem and conflict resolution, and em­
ployee representation. Our assessment of the American system in this
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section of the essay considers how our system compares to the indus­
trial relations systems in two of the most successful economies of the 
post-World War II period: Japan and Germany.
Macroeconomic Issues
The success of an industrial relations system in part depends on its 
ability to meet macroeconomic pay and employment goals.
Experience has shown that even where wages are set at sectoral or even 
more decentralized plant or company levels, it is important to have in­
stitutions ensuring that these lower-level bargains add up to 
noninflationary and high-employment outcomes. Concern for 
noninflationary pay outcomes may appear unnecessary in the face of 
the low inflation rates that have appeared in the United States and else­
where since the mid-1980s. Yet, there is no reason to assume that low 
inflation is likely to persist on its own accord. Consequently, it is im­
portant for national industrial relations systems to possess some sort 
of macroeconomic “coordinating” mechanism to press for 
noninflationary pay settlements. Such coordinating mechanisms have 
played significant roles in helping countries such as Germany and 
Japan to experience low inflation in the post-World War II period 
(Soskice, 1990).
In Japan, collective bargaining occurs primarily at the enterprise level 
and pay increases are set in enterprise agreements. There is, however, 
much coordination in pay setting across enterprises in Japan. This coor­
dination occurs through the simultaneous occurrence of pay bargaining 
in the so-called Spring Offensive, the pattern-setting role played by key 
settlements, and the heavy consultation involving government, labor, 
and management in the establishment of the key settlements.
In Germany, coordination occurs in wage setting through the ne­
gotiation of sectoral collective bargaining agreements. Although this 
sectoral bargaining occurs in a manner different from Japanese coor­
dination, it involves a substantial amount of pattern bargaining and 
multipartite consultation.
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While Japan and Germany (and a number of other countries with 
low inflation) have in common mechanisms that coordinate wage bar­
gaining and focus explicitly on the macroeconomic consequences of 
more decentralized pay negotiations, the United States suffers from 
the absence of such coordinating mechanisms. Although decentral­
ized pay bargaining provides to negotiators in the United States the 
flexibility to respond to microeconomic pressures as they see fit, this 
decentralized bargaining can produce, and in the past has produced, 
inflationary pay outcomes.
The United States faces a particular problem in developing such co­
ordinating mechanisms because of the low level of union representa­
tion. Given the limited representation of employees by unions, it is 
difficult to see how we could design institutions that coordinate pay set­
ting even if we were determined to do so. In other countries, such coor­
dination is facilitated by the presence of unions that represent a sizeable 
share of the workforce and traditions that extend the terms of collective 
bargaining agreements to cover unorganized sectors and employees.
In the face of the substantial economic restructuring that is occur­
ring across industries and the need for large investments in physical 
and human capital, the United States also suffers from the absence of 
coordinating mechanisms that might cushion the social and private 
costs associated with these dislocations. Although it may be rational 
for a firm to lay off employees whenever demand for that firm’s prod­
ucts falls, simultaneous layoffs across many firms can produce harmful 
economy-wide trauma. In recent years the United States has experi­
enced an increase in long-duration unemployment spells, particularly 
for middle-aged and older laid-off employees. Accommodating this 
sort of dislocation through government or private income transfer 
programs has proved costly. It would make more sense to find mecha­
nisms that enhance intra- and interfirm mobility and avoid the unem­
ployment spells in the first place.
There are also clear, rational microeconomic practices that produce 
inefficient macroeconomic outcomes regarding employee training. In 
the modern economy firm-level training is needed to meet the needs of 
technological innovation and workplace reorganization as well as to re­
spond to shortfalls in primary and secondary education. Unfortunately, 
in our system, there is a tendency for underinvestment in training be­
cause firms face the prospect that highly trained employees will move 
to other firms that have not borne the expense of training.6
What is missing in the United States is mechanisms that deal with 
training needs and economic adjustment through the coordination or 
stimulation of local activity. Such mechanisms go against our decen­
tralized collective bargaining structures and private sector fears of 
“governmental intrusion.” In other countries—Germany, for 
example—the provision of training and employment adjustment is 
provided through initiatives involving strong employer associations. 
Once again our system falls short because of the historical tradition of 
weak employer associations and the fact that the associations that do 
exist are focused on political lobbying and not industrial policies.
Microeconomic Issues
At the microeconomic level there are a number of virtues that follow 
from the decentralized collective bargaining traditions that exist in 
our country. Although our system has these micro-level strengths, it 
also has some weaknesses, including the fact that so low a percentage 
of employees are represented by unions. Furthermore, our exclusive 
representation system provides an all-or-nothing representation 
choice to employees and is not responsive to those employees who de­
sire representation through a mechanism other than a trade union. 
Perhaps even more importantly, current economic pressures are pro­
ducing a heightened sense of insecurity among employees that grows 
out of the extensive downsizing and internal restructuring occurring 
in American firms and firms in other countries. As a result, a mis­
match is appearing between corporate needs for flexibility and em­
ployees’ needs for security (Cappelli et al., 1997).
Our system lacks a representation procedure that enables employ­
ees, particularly unorganized employees, to have a voice in the process 
of corporate restructuring. For this reason we, like a growing number 
of our colleagues, favor the initiation of a government-mandated sys­
tem of employee representation. We are not certain whether such rep­
resentation should come through mandated works councils of the 
German variety or, rather, should be allowed to develop through legis­
lation that permits voluntary employee representation procedures that 
are not, in fact, a form of company unionism.7
In the unionized sector there is at least a mechanism to address mi­
croeconomic issues, although we are not fully satisfied with the form 
or operation of existing procedures. As discussed earlier in this essay, 
we would encourage the creation of expanded forums for employee 
and union voice in business decision making, a broadening of the 
bargaining agenda, and the creation of broader problem-resolution 
procedures that would supplement the grievance procedure.
Macro and Micro Coordination
The challenge confronting all industrial relations systems is to create 
both macro and micro institutions that deal with economic pressures. 
There is a tendency in analyses of industrial relations or public poli­
cies to focus on one or the other of these levels. Yet, both levels need to 
be examined and coordinated since the problems handled through ac­
tivities at one level overlap with those of the other. For example, at the 
macro level there is a need for wage settlements that are consistent 
with price stability, while at the micro level plant-level contingent-pay 
procedures are currently expanding. Thus, increasingly, it does not 
make sense to think of pay as only a macro or micro issue. Similarly, 
while there is a tendency for system-wide underinvestment in training 
and a resulting need for industry-wide or sectoral programs to deal 
with training, meaningful training requires input from shop floor- 
level actors who understand where technology is heading and have 
hands-on knowledge of training deficiencies. Again, the stark separa­
tion of macro and micro issues does not make sense.
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Conclusions
For over twenty-five years, until the concession era of the 1980s, the 
New Deal system of industrial relations more or less held together 
(Kochan et al., 1994). For most of the postwar period, the labor move­
ment achieved trendsetting agreements, and non-union employers 
scurried to keep up with advances introduced in organized firms. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, however, it was non-union firms—IBM, 
Motorola, and Kodak—that introduced innovative workplace policies 
while unionized firms became the followers. In the 1980s non-union 
firms continued to be the trendsetters, although the elaboration of 
employee participation processes in the union sector began to shift 
the innovative edge back to that sector.
Did the postwar era really bring an “end to ideology” ? With hind­
sight, it is possible to say that unions and employers merely found it 
convenient to paper over their ideological differences for the sake of a 
pragmatic accommodation at the workplace. Mainstream unions did 
not seek to become partners in the enterprise, not even junior part­
ners. Unions came to terms with the American system of free enter­
prise—a system supported by law and custom and, ultimately, by the 
will of the American people.
Within that system, American unions could exercise profound, if 
carefully circumscribed, influence. They could be the vehicle workers 
used to share the affluence and status of the American middle class. 
They could provide their members with a measure of job protection 
and income security. They could ensure that workers received due 
process and fair treatment on the job. They could affect the develop­
ment of public policies through their lobbying efforts and influence 
on electoral politics. And they retained a potent weapon—the right to 
strike—although increasingly it was channeled and controlled.
But management always retained the core of its authority. Its ability 
to control the enterprise and the workforce was part of the implicit 
social contract between employers and unions in the United States. As 
Kochan et al. note, the postwar industrial relations system worked
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because “it provided stability while also satisfying other basic eco­
nomic and organizational needs of labor and management” (1994: 45). 
The industrial relations system and the macroeconomy were mutually 
reinforcing (a point President Truman would have appreciated) al­
though not directly connected. A long period of sustained economic 
growth allowed unions to push up wages with little fear of negative 
consequences and attain a sense of security.
Of course, it was a false sense of permanency. By the 1980s, many 
forces—recession and economic stagnation, foreign and non-union 
competition, deregulation and divestiture—had undermined the New 
Deal system of industrial relations. The American industrial relations 
system is now only in part the system that Phil Murray, Eric Johnston, 
and the others imagined they were creating in 1945. It is most decid­
edly not a centrally controlled system of wage setting; it has become 
much more highly decentralized than either labor or management 
thought was desirable in the 1940s.
Furthermore, the labor movement has become more of a paper 
tiger than either its friends or its foes thought possible. Switching 
metaphors, Humpty Dumpty has fallen off the wall, and it is unlikely 
he can ever be put together again.
Since the realization that the old system cannot be resurrected has 
now spread widely, our country is in the midst of a struggle to develop 
and then diffuse a new industrial relations system. As we work our 
way through this process, it is critical that both macroeconomic and 
microeconomic problems be managed. Furthermore, now more than 
ever an effective industrial relations system is one that provides for 
coordination across issues as the reorganizations under way in work 
arid worker-management relations increasingly blur the distinction 
between shop floor and economy-wide problems.
The challenges are daunting, but we can draw much strength from 
the depth of our historical legacy. ■
Notes
1 Well before World War II a web of rules emerged where craft unions took hold 
in industries such as the building trades and among transport teamsters.
2 The 1945 conference is thoroughly analyzed in Harris, 1982:111-18. For other 
perspectives on the conference see McClure, 1969: 51-64; Seidman, 1953:223- 
24; and Taylor, 1948:206-10.
3 See New York Times, November 6,1945, p. 1, and subsequent daily coverage by 
the Times through November 29. The independent unions picketed the confer­
ence the day it began, but the union leaders invited to participate crossed the 
picket lines.
4 These include the “mutual growth forums” involving Ford and the UAW, the 
“joint boards” involving the UNITE and Xerox, and the “forum” involving the 
Champion International Corporation and the UPIU.
5 At the time of the incident referred to in this text this plant was part of the 
Rochester Products Division within General Motors. It subsequently became 
part of the AC Rochester and then other divisions within General Motors.
6 This disincentive for microeconomic investments in training can lead an 
economy into a low-skill trap (Finegold and Soskice, 1988).
7 What we have in mind is finding a resolution to the Electromation case con­
troversy that allows employee group participation processes in non-union 
workplaces.
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